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
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10 June 1982

# West Europe Report

No. 1978

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## CONTRACTS INSURE AMPLE SUPPLY OF NATURAL GAS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 10 May 82 pp 54-56

[Text] Klaus Liesen, chief executive officer of the gas distribution enterprise Ruhrgas AG and main proponent of the Soviet-German natural gas agreement, sees great times ahead for his product.

"The policy of replacing oil with imported natural gas," say Liesen, in the end leads "to an improvement in the German balance of payments and to an improvement in supply security."

The balance of payments is helped, claims the country's leading gas expert, because at the German border natural gas is 40 percent cheaper than oil, and in every case it comes from countries that purchase German industrial goods in return.

The nation's supply security increases through natural gas, because the FRG has been signing its new supply contracts extending to beyond the year 2000 only with countries outside OPEC.

Even now all gas deliveries come from countries outside of OPEC: 32 percent from the FRG itself, 32 percent from the Netherlands, 20 percent from the USSR, and 16 percent from Norway.

Meanwhile, the gas industry accounts for 17 percent of German energy consumption, compared with only 5.4 percent in 1970. Of the natural gas sold in Germany, 33 percent is burned by private households and small users, 31 percent by industry, 24 percent in power plants and 12 percent elsewhere.

For the rest of this decade the gas works plan to further increase the share of their environmentally clean product in the total German energy supply. Liesen's board colleague Friedrich Spaeth: "Up to about one-fifth of total primary energy consumption."

In order to assure natural gas supply for the 1990's, Ruhrgas, Thyssengas, Gelsenberg and Briggitta, the four leading German gas companies mainly under the control of multinational oil companies, has purchased so much gas in the meantime, that they could find themselves in a sales pinch beginning about 1986 if they continue to emphasize high prices for the final consumer.

The contract with the Soviets alone provides an additional 11.4 million tons of hard coal units [SKE] in natural gas beginning about 1985. For the same period 2.5 million tons SKE have been contracted with the Norwegians, who want to lay a pipeline about 800 km from the Statfjord and Heimdal fields in the northern part of the North Sea to central Europe.

But during this time the supply contracts for cheaper German and Dutch natural gas are still in force. Thus, the gas quantity offered at the end of the decade will be 14 million tons SKE above the present level--about 24 percent. But if FRG energy consumption continues to fall, then beginning in 1986 even the gas quantity now offered would be sufficient to meet about one-fifth of West German energy demand.

Not until the middle 1990's, think energy politicians, can the gas distributors, who have enjoyed good earnings up to now, again find an adequate market for the quantities that they have already bought. For then most German and Dutch gas wells will be empty--provided that no new gas is found in their vicinity. "That too," says Hans Carsten Runge, future Shell assistant chief, "can certainly not be ruled out."

The gas companies under the influence of big oil are therefore increasingly concerned with avoiding an oversupply with associated losses and falling prices. Thus, in the near future they want to systematically reduce the production and purchase of European gas. For example, Gelsenberg or Brigitta can cut production from its German natural gas wells to a technologically essential level.

In the case of the purchase of Dutch gas, the Germans want to take advantage of certain contract clauses allowing them to take about 30 percent less annually. In this way they can extend contracts with the Dutch for a fixed quantity well into the 1990's.

After completion of the North Sea pipeline, the Germans want to buy significant quantities of gas from the Norwegians only if they can bring down the still high purchase cost of Norwegian gas. On the other hand, the German gas companies want to buy all they can of the cheaper gas from the USSR--and in part they want to put it back where it came from: underground.

This year German gas companies are already beginning a rapid expansion of their network of underground gas storage. They want to convert salt deposits into caverns for gas or liquified gas. And exhausted gas fields--in Emsland, Bavaria, Hessen and on Lake of Constance, for example--very soon are to be filled with imported gas, in order to create a buffer between supply and demand.

The Germans want to make use of the European natural gas association, in order to eliminate further surpluses. This gas supply association extends from the Soviet border to Sicily and also includes countries that--as in the case of France and Germany--have used natural gas less intensively than the Germans to meet their needs.

Even that is still not enough of a buffer for the large German gas buyers. But in order not to be sitting on too large obligations for gas purchases at

end of the decade, very soon the gas companies will initiate specific actions to secure West German gas consumption. Thus, in the fall of 1982, when current gas rates for local suppliers expire, they want to hold prices steady. They hope thereby to restimulate sluggish consumer demand for gas heating. Because the existing distribution network of the gas companies is sufficient for at least another 2 million house connections.

The gas distributors would like to protect their flanks by means of a campaign against the competition of new heat and electric power plants as propagaged by Hamburg's Mayor von Dohnanyi and Prime Minister Rau in North Rhine-Westphalia. A politically motivated subsidy for heat and electric power plants, so says the gas industry of late, would lead to irreversible wrong decisions.

But if it is all to no avail, then the gas people want to do what energy politicians have long vigorously fought: Put old gas-fired power plants back on line and at giveaway prices convert their natural gas into the competing product electricity.

9746

CSO: 3103/459

## BRIEFS

ELECTRICITY PRICE RISE--A new rise in the price of household electricity will be imposed as of 1 July, despite the fact that international oil prices are constantly falling. This was announced by a government spokesman. The increase will be 5 percent, An. Peponis, minister of industry announced and will be computed on the May-June prices. It will remain in effect until the end of 1982, at which time the government will announce its new energy price policy, with a probable increase that will last until the end of 1983. This is the fourth consecutive price rise since last January. [Excerpt] [Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 19 May 82 p 1]

CSO: 4621/370

## BRIEFS

SOVIET OFFICIAL ON TRADE BALANCE--Soviet Trade Official Gubanov holds the view that the balancing of the Finnish-Soviet payments account requires that both sides fulfill all the obligations in accordance with the trade protocol and to the extent which has been agreed. According to Gubanov, it will thus be possible this year to avoid a repetition of last year's situation caused by the refusal of Finnish companies to buy Soviet electricity, gas and oil products. Gubanov spoke today at an eastern trade seminar organized by the National Coalition Party. The balance of Finnish-Soviet trade at the end of last year showed a surplus of Fm 1.9 billion in Finland's favor. This surplus has grown even more this year. [Text] [LD311232 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 0930 GMT 31 May 82]

CSO: 3107/126

## COALITION GOVERNMENT PROGRAM REPORTED

## High Points of Program Discussed

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 19 Mar 82 pp 1, 4

[Text] Speaking on the occasion of the first meeting of the coalition cabinet, Prime Minister Mustafa Cagatay said: "If the Greek-Cypriot side were to come to the intercommunal talks free from its prejudice and its insidious intentions, the task of finding a solution to the Cyprus problem would be made easier." Stating that until now we have been witness to a situation whereby the Greek-Cypriot side sought to convert the intercommunal talks into a springboard towards intentions and objectives that fall contrary to the realities of Cyprus, Cagatay said:

"The problem cannot be resolved by intentionally and purposefully leading the intercommunal talks towards an impasse and then pointing a finger at the lack of progress. For the resolution of the Cyprus problem, we envision a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation that is independent and unaffiliated. We also firmly believe that the intercommunal talks constitute the only means through which such a result can be obtained."

In replying to Spiros Kiprianou's allegations that the presence of the Turkish army on Cyprus is based on the objective of bringing about partition of the island, Cagatay emphasized that the presence on Cyprus of the Turkish army was not for the purpose of creating the conditions required for partition, but rather for the purpose of achieving a solution that is lasting as well as peaceful. He said: "The Turkish army has brought peace to our island and will remain on our island until peace can be definitively ensured by a permanent solution. Cagatay said that our national cause is going through a very critical period and that great responsibilities as well as duties befall our government in the defense of our communal and national rights. He added that given such conditions, he had no doubts that parties making up the coalition would display solidarity and a sincere effort based on good faith that would allow our democracy's first coalition experiment to be successful and would permit the resolution of the problems on the agenda.

Cagatay said that as it is made clear from the government's composition, great care will be taken to emphasize agricultural and industrial production, the development of our foreign trade and the combating of our difficulties in the

field of tourism. He said that the organization of the ministries had been conducted accordingly and that certain priorities had been adopted in conformity with the government's program. He provided the following information concerning these priorities:

"Among topics which will be designated for resolution within a specific time frame we may list the adjustments to the Minimum Wage Law so that this law can be brought up to date, the elimination of shortcomings in the National Insurance Law, new modifications in the Income Tax Law to benefit those with limited and fixed income, the adoption of measures required to offset the losses that will be suffered by our agricultural sector as the result of drought, the increasing of social assistance payments, the preparation of a law that will provide for compensation to our fellow citizens who suffered financial hardship in the matter concerning Cypriot Liras and finally the passage of legal guidelines that will make possible a more effective war against smuggling. Once our government program takes its final form, it will be possible for us to provide greater detail concerning the planned activities of our government.

#### Foreign Policy, Cyprus Problem Addressed

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 19 Mar 82 p 1, 4

[Text] The government program appears today on the agenda of the Assembly of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus immediately after the election of an assembly president. At a meeting which took place at the Finance Ministry the day before yesterday, the government program was finalized and printed by the State Printing House. The meeting was attended by Economics and Finance Minister Salih Cosar, Commerce and Tourism Minister Nazif Borman, Industry and Cooperatives Minister Ismet Kotak as well as Education, Culture, Youth and Sports Minister Ahmet Atamosy.

It is expected that today, the government's program will be presented to the assembly and read by the Prime Minister.

The program consists mainly of full and detailed discussion of topics contained within the "Cooperation Protocole" signed between the National Unity Party and the Democratic People's Party.

The Program of the Government of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus is 20 pages long and has been prepared under the leadership of Cagatay and approved by the Head of State in conformity with Article 87 of our Constitution. The program begins with a "Presentation of deep gratitude to the Turkish soldier and our freedom fighters who at the cost of their blood have contributed to the free TFSC of today."

The government program which will be read by Cagatay at the Assembly respectively focuses upon the following areas: the economy, commerce, industry, cooperatives, education, culture, youth and sports, the press and communication, the freedom of religion and conscience, agriculture, public works and transportation, health, housing, tourism and social issues. The program also touches upon State Economic Enterprises and goes on to address "foreign relations." Views concerning internal security, labor and public administration are also provided by the program.

The full text of the government program which is expected to be read today at the Federated Assembly by the Prime Minister has been obtained by the Cagdas News Agency. In foreign relations, the program stipulates that "as it has been the case until today, a foreign policy should be followed that is worthy of the support of the Turkish motherland and that undertakings that do not fall in conformity with the motherland or that could hurt it be avoided."

In accordance with the same program, and within the context of resolving the Cyprus problem the rejection of any proposal contrary to the wishes of the Turkish population living within the TFSC and the shunning of any measures that would endanger our security will be continued. We will also continue to oppose any attempts to obscure our right and status as an equal founding partner in the formation of a state that would constitute the foundation of our liberty and independence. In addition, the 1976 Decision of the Assembly will once again be placed on the agenda in the light of recent developments, as it is a decision that sheds light upon the political solution envisaged for the Cyprus problem. Peaceful approaches and methods will not be abandoned in the search for a political solution, however, our national rights will not be sacrificed and measures necessary for the protection of these rights will be taken.

In conformity with the principle of finding a solution to the problem through the continuation of the intercommunal talks as well as the principle of opposing any attempt to internationalize the problem, the government's program expresses a conviction that peace as well as a solution can be achieved on the basis of four principles listed as follows:

1. The attaining by the Turkish community to the north of the status of a powerful state, refraining from any concessions in the area of security and economic sufficiency,
2. Opposing the consideration at the conference table of any decision by the United Nations that has been taken solely as the result of consultations with the Greek-Cypriot side and without allowing the Turkish Cypriot side to speak on the issue, and in a manner that does not reflect the realities of Cyprus while undermining the national cause,
3. The continuation of Turkey's role as a guarantor,
4. The taking of serious steps towards meeting the economic, political and legal needs of the community as a separate entity.

The government program which states that peace as well as the resolution of the Cyprus problem will be brought about within a framework based on these principles, also envisages further increase in the number of foreign missions and the development of such missions as well as providing for an effective effort to make our cause known to world public opinion.

In addition, the section pertaining to foreign relations within the government's program states that "Our primary goals will be the further development of our relations with Islamic countries on the basis of friendship and brotherhood, the defense of our rights and status at the level of the EEC, and to make our voice heard at the United Nations as well as other international forums by taking whatever steps are required for this purpose."

According to the government program, "Support for the liberation struggle of our Palestinian brothers will be continued within the framework of a policy that sides with our religious brothers who are engaged in liberation struggles and efforts will be mounted to establish good relations with neighboring states."

Among these fundamental objectives the program mentions the "Continuation of contacts for the purpose of bringing about an order which is respectful of community as well as human rights; in which the two communities can live peacefully as equal founding partners of a Cypriot state that is independent, unaffiliated, bi-zonal and bi-communal." The program also stipulates "Opposition to intervention by bloc powers in the Cyprus problem without seeking to differentiate among blocs."

The new government's program also gives room to Turkish expatriates. The section pertaining to "Turks Abroad" pledges continued attention to the social and cultural problems of our fellow citizens living in foreign countries as well as the providing of guidance and convenience to those who will contribute to the economy of the TFSC. It is also stated that a Solidarity and Information Unit for Turks Abroad" will be established for the purpose of providing attention and seeking a solution to all problems.

9491

CSO: 4654/246

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

BRIEFS

CONSPIRACY REPORTS REFUTED--The government spokesman referred to various press reports on the establishment of a conspiratorial organization and said facts available to the appropriate authorities indicate that certain persons from well known circles are making contacts for reviving their association [epanasindhesis--Greek]. These moves, the spokesman added, are closely watched. For the time being there are no indications that this reassociation of these persons is aimed at use of force. [Text] [NC261313 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 1030 GMT 26 May 82]

POLITICAL ADVISER RESIGNS--President of the republic Kiprianou has accepted Andreas Dhimitriadhis' resignation from the post of special adviser on political and internal issues at the request of Dhimitriadhis himself. The president thanked Dhimitriadhis for the services he has rendered to date and for his substantive contribution to the government's work. In addition, in a statement Dhimitriadhis noted that even after his resignation he is determined to continue to struggle at Kiprianou's side. [Text] [NC 022117 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 1630 GMT 2 Jun 82 NC]

CSO: 4621/360

## NONSOCIALIST LEADERS SEE LIBERAL CHIEF AS NEXT PREMIER

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 26 Apr 82 p 5

[Article by Christian Brondum]

[Text] Both the Center-Democrats and the Christian People's Party maintain that Liberal chairman Henning Christophersen would be their candidate for prime minister in the event the nonsocialist parties get another chance to try to form a government.

That is what the leaders of the two parties, Erhard Jacobsen (CD [Center-Democrat]) and Christian Christensen (KRF [Christian People's Party]), said after POLITIKEN quoted Conservative chairman Poul Schluter yesterday as saying that the Conservatives would not back Henning Christophersen again if Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen resigns.

According to POLITIKEN, the cooperation between V [Liberal Party] and K [Conservative Party] is definitely over and as far as the Conservatives are concerned, there is only one alternative to Anker Jorgensen, namely Poul Schluter.

Poul Schluter denied POLITIKEN's account yesterday: "POLITIKEN's report of what I said at the closed membership meeting on Saturday is not correct, although it is entertaining. The Conservative Party has not taken a stand on the composition and leadership of a nonsocialist government, because the matter is not relevant."

With the statement, Poul Schluter is repeating what he has said publicly in the past about the leadership of a future nonsocialist government, namely that the Conservatives themselves will decide who the party will back for prime minister and that the decision from December to back Henning Christophersen does not automatically mean the party will back the Liberal chairman again. This view does not rule Henning Christophersen out either. The decision will depend on the political situation when the time comes.

The leader of the Christian People's Party, Christian Christensen, told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that Henning Christophersen is still the best person to preside over a broad cooperative effort. "In the situation we have now with

the March package and its financing, this is not the time for conflict over this issue."

Christian Christensen said that a Conservative prime minister would give the Radical Liberals and to a certain extent the Social Democrats an alibi for working against a nonsocialist government.

CD leader Erhard Jacobsen emphasized that the four nonsocialist parties generally enjoy a good and close cooperation on all major issues. "That is the important thing. I do not think Anker Jorgensen will resign now when he is almost 60 years old and Denmark will be assuming the EC chairmanship. I do not understand discussing personalities in this context. It is a question of who can gain Radical Liberal support and Henning Christophersen probably has the greatest chance of accomplishing that."

Liberal political spokesman Uffe Ellemann-Jensen said: "This is not the time to sow doubts concerning the fact that there is a liberal-nonsocialist alternative. The people need to know that an alternative to Anker Jorgensen does exist. I am sure that unfriendly elements of the press have exaggerated any remarks that might have been made." He saw no reason to get in touch with the Conservatives on this matter.

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CSO: 3106/115

## SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S PARTY NAMES PELLE VOIGT NEW CHAIRMAN

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 26 Apr 82 p 5

[Article by Christian Brondum]

[Text] Pelle Voigt, 32 years old, a member of Folketing for SF [Socialist People's Party] since last December, is the model of the flower child turned politician and he is now regarded as one of SF's influential and promising leader figures.

In recent days he has really come into the media spotlight after expressing strong skepticism concerning the possibilities of an economic compromise that included the Radical Liberals. After a premature statement to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE on SF's own economic proposals, he was censured by his Folketing group for having moved too quickly and arbitrarily. Statements Pelle Voigt made to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE Thursday created even more problems for a compromise among S [Social Democrats], SF and R [Radical Liberals].

To the surprise of most people, Pelle Voigt acted in the SF delegation in talks with the prime minister concerning a possible economic compromise soon after the election. The public and the journalists did not know much about him, but in reality ever since he became a member in 1970, he has made an increasingly strong mark on the party's inner circle which has more influence on party policy than is the case in the other big parties, including the Social Democrats.

As the son of municipal politician Palle Voigt of Hvidovre, he grew up with SF. His father was with the party from the beginning and although in his "flower-child years," Pelle Voigt tended to regard politics as a rotten business, he went along when the party was split up into SF and VS [Left-Socialists] in the late 1960's. Almost immediately he became chairman of the SF youth group and after several years as executive committee and business committee member, he became a central figure in the showdown with the so-called "Larsenites" in SF. He was present when the executive committee at the time, which included Larsenites Sigurd Omann and Morten Lange, held a meeting in Tvind prior to the stormy national congress in 1976 in order to clarify the disagreements. On that occasion it was suggested that the

delegates should sit on the floor and hold a "sensitivity session" to uncover the real conflicts. The Larsenites left the premises in anger, while Pelle Voigt was left there smiling to himself. Later, somewhat to the surprise of himself and others, Voigt was mentioned as a possible new party chairman in INFORMATION. He was to be elected in place of Gert Petersen as a step toward unifying the party. The idea was part of the Larsenites' plan for remaining in the top leadership of the party.



Pelle Voigt--young SF member on his way to the top.

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CSO: 3106/115

BOELLING ON PRESENT, FUTURE OF FRG,GDR RELATIONS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 17 May 82 pp 24-29

[Interview with State Secretary Klaus Boelling by Richard Kiessler and Olaf Petersen in the SPIEGEL offices in Bonn about his tour as permanent representative in East Berlin: "'We Cannot Tell the GDR What To Do'"]

[Text] SPIEGEL: Mr Boelling, look back on your 14-month tour in East Berlin, are you in a position to say about yourself that you were the right man at the right place?

Boelling: Surely that is up to others to judge. But I will not sidestep the question. First, I don't think I was the wrong man in that for me, as a Berliner since the end of the war, since the forcible merger of the KPD and the SPD, German policy had been not merely a political-intellectual subject but a subject of great emotional importance.

Secondly, some people in the GDR did sense that I did not regard it as a merely objective task but (and I think this had to be so and will have to be so in the future) as a task which must be tackled with personal involvement.

SPIEGEL: This sounds as if your predecessor, Guenter Gaus, were talking.

Boelling: If there is a lack of heart (and I don't mean that sentimentally in any way) it becomes routine, and nothing is more damaging in efforts for more neighborly relations than routine.

SPIEGEL: There has been some criticism of the way you handled your job. From East Berlin came the charge that you made even high-ranking SED representatives feel all too plainly that actually you regarded only the head of state and party, Erich Honecker, or at best his closest confidants, as suitable persons to talk with.

Boelling: If that were so, it certainly would have been an arrogant attitude. Let me just note that these must have been talebearers from a rather low level of the GDR authorities.

In any case (and I want to say so without any vanity), during my valedictory calls the chairman of the Council of State himself and members of the Politburo

let me know that one had sensed during the all too short period of 14 months that I had tried to seriously cope with the job.

SPIEGEL: Your distaste for what they call really existing socialism in the GDR, you made little effort to conceal. Not exactly the way a diplomat behaves!

Boelling: That is a fairytale to which I really need not attribute great significance, because at no time did I display the manners of a lumberjack. Nor was I accused of doing so. I did at times give vent to negative impressions concerning that socialism, but at no time with any provocative intent.

When Erich Honecker said that it definitely might happen for precisely this really existing socialism to knock at our door, I took the liberty to state that it might also happen the other way around--for our democratic system of a social constitutional state to knock at the door of the GDR. And that I really was quite confident as to who would rather open the door to whom.

SPIEGEL: What we mean is a lack of a personal attitude toward that state--a readiness, certified to your predecessor Gaus, to take the GDR as it is.

Boelling: I was not prepared to personally absorb a number of things. But it is not my business to comment on the attitude of others. Since the signing of the Basic Treaty I have been saying that we must recognize the sovereignty of the GDR without mental reservations, or without what is called *dolus in international law*.

After all, you know, I did not drive through the GDR as a covert, camouflaged resistance fighter, and I certainly did not misunderstand my job so badly as to interpret it as being one of lending the people there support in the sense of moral rearmament, of telling them that they only had to exercise a little patience until there was reunification along the lines of Adenauer's policies. That is grotesque.

SPIEGEL: There was criticism of you on this side as well. As a result of your disputes with Egon Franke about the extent of your responsibilities, the minister for inner-German relations relieved you of one of your key subjects of negotiation--inter-German traffic. Is that not a serious defeat in that office?

Boelling: That is a nice melodramatic question but one that does not do any justice at all to the state of affairs. At no time was there any quarrel about spheres of responsibilities between Minister Franke and me. Only, to the last day I desired and demanded that the director of the Permanent Representation and its employees always be informed reliably about all pertinent questions of relations between the two states so as not to give the other side, which takes a very strict and uniform stand, the opportunity of playing one off against the other in Bonn.

SPIEGEL: So this information was not forthcoming?

Boelling: The information was not always what it should have been in the interest of a concentrated and efficient effort. That I will admit openly. But as regards the concepts of what was operationally necessary, the minister and I agreed at all times. Our relationship is what it has always been--one of friendly candor.

SPIEGEL: At the end of your brief tour of duty, there is a threat of a new low in inter-German relations. Who is responsible for this? Solely the GDR?

Boelling: No, certainly not solely the GDR. It seems to me it is essentially a question of trends that have occurred outside the two German states. The air has become unhealthy not because the leadership of the GDR or because the FRG government desire it but....

SPIEGEL: ...You mean the low in East-West relations?

Boelling: Yes. I want to add, however, that, as already in the days of Konrad Adenauer and Walter Ulbricht, there exist quite significant forces in both German states to whom the process of a laborious normalization but one characterized by a certain consistency is suspect and who themselves rather contribute to the slowing down of this process.

SPIEGEL: How do you assess the role of Erich Honecker in this context? Is he still in a position to prevail against those who are applying the brakes in his own Politburo?

Boelling: My impression of the chairman of the GDR Council of State is that his authority is unquestioned and that the force of his arguments enables him to prevail--for example, as regards the assessment of the Werbellin meeting.

SPIEGEL: One may be permitted some doubts there. After the Werbellin meeting the chancellor announced that it would turn out "in the course of 1982" that "a number of difficult questions standing between us" had been "brought closer to a solution." Did Helmut Schmidt not promise too much?

Boelling: The chancellor did not promise anything that he could not have promised with a clear conscience. For example, he did not say anything at all about having agreed with Honecker about a substantial correction of the minimum exchange which we continue to consider absolutely necessary. Schmidt did not arouse false hopes.

SPIEGEL: Presumably the GDR wants to make us believe that it has already fulfilled its obligation by expanding the list for trips for urgent family reasons.

Boelling: That was an important step, for precisely trips from the GDR to the Federal Republic are among the most important subjects in the discussion of the fellow Germans [Landsleute] in the GDR about improvements between the two states. We know, a comparatively short time after the introduction of the changed provisions, that traffic for urgent family reasons has increased by 20 percent. But one will not be able to speak of a status quo plus until

the number of 40,000 travelers a year, which we had only very few years ago and which then dropped drastically, is exceeded substantially.

What I would like to acknowledge expressly in this connection is the positive efforts of the GDR in bringing families together. Nevertheless it continues to be the case that what Helmut Schmidt said about prospects that can be experienced will have to be demonstrated further, in a convincing manner, by the GDR through pertinent actions before the year ends.

SPIEGEL: But precisely as regards the point which is crucial for Bonn--a clear correction of the mandatory exchange, there will probably be no movement in the foreseeable future?

Boelling: It is my impression that the leadership of the GDR was clearly aware even before the meeting between Erich Honecker and Helmut Schmidt that this subject cannot be cured by the passing of time but that, given its psychological constitution, the leadership will react with particular sensitivity and allergy whenever we ask East Berlin to deliver in this question but also in other questions.

SPIEGEL: It seems that this is precisely where the problem lies, for Bonn has always stressed the fact that there is a "political-psychological overall connection" between human relief and economic agreements.

Boelling: That's right.

SPIEGEL: Apparently there is, however, no agreement in the federal government as to what this means concretely. Minister Franke the other day stated in no uncertain terms that if there was no movement in the compulsory exchange as far as the GDR was concerned, its interest-free overdraft credit in inter-German trade would be reduced from the current DM 850 million to the original DM 200 million. You, on the other hand, say that the swing must not be used as a lever. Which applies?

Boelling: I don't find it all that unusual for a government not to express itself in a way which perhaps the Lichterfeld Military Academy has described as ideal. The federal government adheres precisely to this political-psychological overall connection. My GDR interlocutors told me during the last days that they understood that. To this extent the line of the federal government is crystal clear.

We are not so ingenuous as to think that we can draw a straight line from one point to the next. The swing at no time has been an instrument for unhinging the other side if it does not immediately fulfill our wishes.

SPIEGEL: In 1974, though, the leverage worked quite well when the GDR reduced a doubling of the minimum exchange again.

Boelling: No one tried to create the impression in 1974 either that we wanted to present the GDR with ultimatums. This policy of ultimatums perhaps leads

to satisfaction here and there as far as speeches in Parliament are concerned, but whoever is serious about human relief cannot hope for any gain at all in that direction.

SPIEGEL: Whoever is serious about the swing will have to state after 30 June, when the current provisions expire, what is supposed to happen then.

Boelling: That's right. The federal government will form an opinion on this in the very near future. But I think it is clear even today that we do not want to mow down anyone. Rather, because there is an interest on both sides in at least preserving the present state of inter-German trade and because this interest-free overdraft credit is of course important for the GDR as far as foreign currency is concerned, we will find formulas preventing a return to confrontation in the relations between us and the GDR.

SPIEGEL: In other words, no drastic reduction in the swing even if nothing has happened by then as far as the compulsory exchange is concerned.

Boelling: I think I have said all on that subject that can be said at the moment.

SPIEGEL: At the latest since the setback in the case of the minimum exchange, our suspicion has grown that the federal government does not have any fairly long term German policy concept.

Boelling: This is a reproach made rashly by a number of people who do not have the proper perspective as to how uncommonly complicated the situation between the two German states in fact is despite all the real improvements in the past year.

The fact is, however, that we are still very far removed from reasonable relations. One underestimates and sometimes--particularly among the opposition--suppresses the fact that we cannot, in any way at all, tell the GDR what to do. All that we have accomplished and all that we still want to accomplish, we can accomplish only with, not against, the GDR.

SPIEGEL: And yet, according to the Basic Treaty, more is possible. Have the government and the chancellor really done everything to take full advantage of the treaty?

Boelling: The Basic Treaty, as Herbert Wehner has rightly pointed out, certainly has not yet been fully taken advantage of. On the other hand, the trend toward delimitation continues to be topical as far as the GDR is concerned. This, in the GDR leadership's own estimate, sets limits for all our efforts which we cannot cross, however beautiful our Germany policy concept may be. Moreover the elbowroom has narrowed for the GDR, and it is also true in our case that we are not alone in the world.

SPIEGEL: When the coffers in Bonn were still full, it was easier to approach the main aim of a social-liberal Germany policy, of achieving human relief

between the two states. Today the money is lacking. Isn't that another reason why one has to come up with something new?

Boelling: There has been a formula for a long time which describes our Germany policy quite inadequately, which in fact is a caricature, namely, "Humaneness versus funds."

SPIEGEL: That is the main line of the opposition.

Boelling: That's right. That has never been the case, though I know as well as you do that in certain contexts where it is a question of the life and freedom of people, financial questions can also play a role. That is no secret. But if I have learned to assess the leadership of the GDR more or less correctly in the past 14 months, it is not only out to get money from the government treasuries in Bonn. It also pursues very basic political aims. According to my observations, these rank higher than, for instance, a gain in interest through the swing.

SPIEGEL: What kind of aims are they?

Boelling: They are the demands formulated by General Secretary Honecker in his speech in Gera in October 1980. And if anyone still thinks that they are maximum demands which we need not take particularly seriously, he is mistaken.

SPIEGEL: Yet the government does not want to negotiate at all about some Gera demands. For constitutional reasons, the federal government, for instance, cannot consider recognizing a GDR citizenship....

Boelling: ...nor does it want to do so.

SPIEGEL: Has then at least something been done about the concrete complaints of East Berlin?

Boelling: We had in fact a hardly tolerable situation here when citizens of the GDR applying here for a passport to travel to the West had to surrender their GDR passports. That certainly was discrimination, just as it made no sense and was absurd for GDR citizens to receive callup notices. Whatever we could do to straighten things out, we have done in the meantime.

SPIEGEL: Let us take wish No 2 of the general secretary's list. What would Bonn lose if the permanent representations were turned into normal embassies?

Boelling: That is not a question of losing something. I warn against considering it a question of prestige....

SPIEGEL: ...Surely that is the way the GDR sees it.

Boelling: I am talking about the federal government. We continue to hold the view that, notwithstanding the fact that the GDR is a sovereign state, it

is not a foreign country. I am deeply convinced that we cannot look at the GDR the same way as at any other state. The Federal Republic, too, is Germany in the eyes of the GDR and not just any kind of state.

SPIEGEL: To mention Honecker's third demand, has not the time come to abolish the central office for recording acts of violence at the inter-German border?

Boelling: It is legitimate to ask whether the way in which that central office of record operates needs to continue for all time. But for us to think about this critically also requires certain rectifications in the attitude of the other side.

SPIEGEL: The shooting would have to stop.

Boelling: Of course, Nor does the whole antihuman setup of this border accord with what we intended in article 1 of the Basic Treaty--a development of relations in the direction of good-neighbor relations. In the GDR too there are people with political judgment who are pondering this with self-criticism.

SPIEGEL: Why--the last item on Honecker's list--has the course of the Elbe boundary not been fixed after all this time?

Boelling: Because there are no really reliable data on which to base an unequivocal course of this boundary.

SPIEGEL: So the boundary might run any way, after all?

Boelling: The federal government has made it possible with the GDR for hardly any shooting or no shooting at all to occur at the German river of destiny between Schnackenburg and Lauenburg. One ought not to take this state of affairs for granted or consider it guaranteed. For that reason alone, we are interested in this question of border marking, which continues to be pending, being settled one day. But Bonn can act in this matter only together with the Government of Lower Saxony....

SPIEGEL: ...which perhaps is saving the border settlement as a morning gift to the GDR from a conservative Bonn government?

Boelling: It would be exceedingly regrettable if some people viewed Germany policy in such a partisan manner.

SPIEGEL: Is it not necessary altogether to come up with a different quality of political contacts with the GDR? Your predecessor proposed to agree on holding annual inter-German summit meetings and also to deepen the exchange of political views with the GDR in other fields.

Boelling: That is the very aim of Federal Chancellor Schmidt, whom a number of people have always tried to accuse of not being sufficiently motivated for a Germany policy.

SPIEGEL: Has he now learned something?

Boelling: He did not have to. Already as a young man and as a soldier, he experienced the German terrain now forming part of GDR territory as nuclear German land, as it were. Whoever observed Schmidt on 13 December 1981 in the cathedral at Guestrow--that beleaguered town--knows that while this Hamburger does not think on "all-German" lines, he very much has the whole of Germany in mind.

SPIEGEL: Can you give your successor, Hans-Otto Braeutigam, some hope to take along on his way that East Berlin, even if it does not want to budge in the question of minimum exchange, at least will meet some other Bonn wishes--for example, agreeing to an expansion of the small border traffic and 24-hour provision for visits around the clock?

Boelling: I really would have learned nothing at all in my time in East Berlin if I advised my successor in DER SPIEGEL that he should concentrate on one thing or another in the expectation that the GDR would make concessions.

SPIEGEL: If there is no movement at all in the very near future, will the chancellor continue to think that a visit by the SED general secretary this year makes sense?

Boelling: One has to take the GDR leadership by its word as regards its positive assessments of the meeting of Werbellin. But we too must not refuse a dialogue concerning the subjects important to the GDR. I warn against a propagandist treatment of the subject.

SPIEGEL: And Honecker's visit?

Boelling: It will take place at a time both sides consider meaningful and rewarding.

SPIEGEL: This year?

Boelling: That is to be hoped.

SPIEGEL: Then it could happen that a government is in power which does not want the Honecker visit at all.

Boelling: When the GDR claims that there are some not unimportant politicians of the opposition making overtures to Bonn to say that it might be much easier to get along with a CDU/CSU-led government than with the Schmidt-Genscher government, I cannot check to see whether there in fact have been such contacts, as is claimed by the GDR.

From conversations of my own with high-ranking members of the opposition I know, however, that the operational demeanor of this federal government is viewed there in almost all contexts as substantively correct. What is remarkable is that those who are eagerly making efforts for talks with important

GDR leaders, talk quite different when it looks like it is profitable here from a partisan point of view than they do vis-a-vis their interlocutors in the GDR. This attitude is not exactly convincing.

One might also call it hypocritical.

SPIEGEL: Thank you for this interview, Mr Boelling.

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CSO: 3103/470

## PRESS ORGANS OF RIVAL CP WINGS DIFFER ON CONGRESS ANALYSES

Liberal Organ: A Finnish Party's Own Problems

Helsinki KANSAN UUTiset in Finnish 12 May 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Party Meetings"]

[Test] Cooperative relations between the Finnish Communist Party and the Soviet Communist Party have long historical traditions. They extend to V. I. Lenin and all the way back to the day the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] was established -- actually even further, to that historical struggle which Finland's old workers' movement and the Russian revolutionary movement waged together against Tsarism. As is known, this struggle had a decisive effect on the most important national goal of the Finnish people, the realization of our country's independence.

Great value is placed on these cooperative relations in all the organizations of the Finnish Communist Party. At joint meetings of the two parties there has been extensive discussion of international questions, questions concerning cooperative relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, and cooperation between the two parties. These meetings have served as the impetus for many initiatives concerning the development of cooperation between Finland and the Soviet Union, initiatives which have also reached practical fruition.

At a meeting of the parties held in Moscow joint concern of the parties was expressed as a result of recent developments in the international situation and emphasis was placed on the struggle of the people's masses for peace, disarmament, and detente. Naturally, the mutual cooperation and solidarity of communist and workers' parties is of central importance in this struggle.

In the joint communique a special evaluation is made of the development of Finnish-Soviet relations. Representatives of the CPSU in this connection emphasized that important contribution which the Finnish Communist Party has made to the development of cooperative relations between the two countries.

Representatives of the SKP informed representatives of the fraternal party in this same connection on the work of the forthcoming extraordinary congress. It is clear that the resolution of problems connected with the congress is exclusively an issue of the representatives of party organizations coming together in Helsinki on Friday and Saturday.

According to the statement given by Chairman Saarinen yesterday various understandings also became apparent at this meeting with respect to recent development in the SKP.

#### Stalinist Organ Rejects Government Participation

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 11 May 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Expansion of Government"]

[Text] A deliberation of the government question from various points of view is not surprising. The fact that proposals concerning the inclusion of the Conservative Party in the government or the expansion of the government base toward the "SKP's minority" are made from time to time is only an indication that the government is in crisis. It is, indeed, remaining intact, but it fears that it will fall or that it will otherwise become subjected to severe political pressure coming from below. In order to alleviate this pressure, it would need the Conservative Party, on the one hand, and a person representing Communists who consistently support the main line of the SKP, on the other hand.

It is certain that if this dual protection proposed by Aarne Saarinen and Veikko Saarto can be realized, the government could breathe a sigh of relief. But but ...

It is not a question of the composition of the government, but, above all, a question of its policy. This is not even mentioned by those making this proposal. The Conservative Party could very well approve present policy; in the opinion of the Conservative Party domestic and economic policy would be acceptable even in the event that it is moved a couple points "to the left". Indeed, it is presently a rightwing policy.

But present policy cannot be approved by those Communists who are for the interests of workers and the SKP's policy line. For this reason it is mere wishful thinking to expect that the government base could be expanded "to the left". Since government policy is contrary to the interests of the workers at least in domestic and economic policy, the issue has in this respect been exhausted.

However, in politics nothing is ever unconditionally and definitively nailed shut. Politics and policies must be changed in accordance with the changing situation. In this lies one of the most important characteristics of the principles of politics. If the government's economic policy is drastically changed in another direction, if policy begins to be directed against big capital, a new situation will have been created for a discussion of a government base.

At this time there is nothing to indicate any change. Not the SKP's internal situation. Not the readiness of other ruling parties. And also not the fact that the representatives of workers' organizations are closely bound -- and furthermore without conditions -- to present policy.

Thus an expansion of the government base "to the left" is now impossible. Whether the Conservative Party should be taken into the government is, on the other hand, another story. The Conservative Party is satisfied with present policy. And the Conservative Party will, of course, make much to do of SKP Chairman Saarinen's assurances that the Communists and the Conservatives can work together in the government. But Saarinen is talking about invested powers.

#### Stalinist Organ Hits Aalto, Kajanoja

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 11 May 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Selection of SKP Leaders"]

[Text] As the SKP congress approaches speculation concerning personalities and individuals is increasing from day to day. The names of candidates for chairman and first secretary as well as Politburo members have glittered in big letters. At times it is known for certain that Arvo Aalto has the best chances of becoming chairman and at times Kajanoja has a secure hold from the side.

However, in the opinion of those who have predicted their candidacy both of their weaknesses are an ideological incompetence and a lack of political comprehension. It is said that Kajanoja has too little experience. Aalto is called an apathetic prince, whom it is doubtful anyone will approve although it will become necessary to support him because of conditions.

At a recent meeting of the SKP Central Committee a speech was given in which an individual very close to Aalto declared that Aalto cannot be elected to any important position. This was most likely a shock for Aalto as well as his supporters.

Another person who is under continuous attack and has been labelled as incompetent is Arvo Kemppainen, in whose shoes nobody wants to be. However, if he succeeds in obtaining some important position, for example, as a member of the Politburo, the SKP will find itself with a strong anti-Soviet base. It is doubtful that many want this.

Those who are the most moderate in this issue emphasize that in the selection of individuals care must be taken to ensure that experience, ideological strength, and political skill will be represented. The present course of more than a decade is not a good recommendation for those majority members who have put the party in this situation.

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CSO: 3107/116

## KKE, PASOK, ND START PREPARATIONS FOR MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 26 Apr 82 p 1

/Text/ KKE announced yesterday its first candidates for mayor in the Attiki basin. All are presently mayors: P. Makris of Kaisariani, N. Paximadas of Petroupolis, I. Gallos of Kallithea, D. Skambas of Khaidari, D. Soulimiotis of Ag. Varvara, V. Katsaros of Kamatero, L. Thermogiannis of Metamorfosis and D. Malagardis of Korydallos.

RIZOSPASTIS published the names and cited the argument that these candidates "stand high in the conscience of the people" and called to mind the recent decision of the KKE Central Committee according to which the party's central objective in the coming municipal elections is the election of as many communist mayors as possible. In the coming days KKE will announce more mayoral candidates in the Athens area.

## PASOK

KKE avoided naming candidates in municipalities having PASOK mayors who, according to reports, will again be supported for reelection by the party. They are: D. Beis of Athens; V. Papadionysios of Galatsi; F. Sakkellaridis of Zografos; G. Iliakopoulos of Irakleion in Attiki; D. Evstathiadis in Argroupolis; I. Gryllis of Rendis; Vretos of Menidi; St. Georgas of Ano Liosia; A. Dimitriou of Agioi Anargyroi; and N. Perkizas of Khalandri. PASOK will also support the candidacy of I. Kourkoulos in Kerkyra, K. Andoniou in Mesolongi and St. Benos in Kalamata.

PASOK has not yet announced officially all the candidates it will support, but it was learned that it does not intend to exhaust itself in negotiations with other parties concerning critical election districts such as in Piraeus and that, on the contrary, it will decide [on candidates] within the month of May.

## ND Problems

The nomination of ND candidates has raised serious problems within the party due to the fact that many cadres are seeking the party's support and especially in Athens (G. Plytas, Tz. Tzanetakis, N. Anagnostopoulos), in Piraeus, Salonica and in other large municipalities. The municipal election will probably increase the rift tendencies within ND given that the various sides are trying to strengthen their position for serving their general political plans.

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CSO: 4621/339

## PAPER DEFENDS PUBLICITY GIVEN TO DISAPPROVAL OF DIKO-AKEL ALLIANCE

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 3 May 82 p 11

[Editorial]

[Text] When the premier of Greece takes the initiative none of his predecessors dared take with an objective at internationalizing the Cyprus question, when he achieves unity in a struggle for vindicating and not for reconciling "realism"--the return to the dark channels of impasse of the intercommunal talks which as time passes legalize the Turkish established facts--such initiatives cannot pass without comment.

The government promised to inform the people fully [and to follow] an open policy and not the hypocrisy of a murky diplomacy. Faithful to its promise, the government is obligated to make public its reservations and objections to the joint declaration of the Democratic Party [DIKO]-AKEL to the degree this declaration attempts to define a new framework for internationalizing the Cyprus question as agreed upon during the premier's recent trip to Cyprus.

The concealment of this difference in views reminds one of that sad past when all the governments of the Right were forcing Makarios to announce that "a complete meeting of the minds with the national center [Athens] was achieved," even though the exact opposite was true. Even during the dictatorship when the tyrants were plotting his overthrow, they continued to announce such "meeting of the minds" and lied shamelessly.

The government of Change does not want to follow this tactic of deceit. For this reason the clarifying statement by the government spokesmen was necessary in order to answer the question of the government's position on the Kyprianou-AKEL agreement which assured the Cypriot politician of AKEL's support during the next elections and which abandons the intensive effort for the internationalization of the Cyprus question.

The Greek statement referred only to the issue of "the joint DIKO-AKEL program" which considers the bankrupt inter-communal talks as the "most qualified" solution as concerns the national aspects of the issue. No reference was made to the internal affairs of Cyprus and KKE hurried to "renounce" [such omission] with a strong statement.

The government commented only on one paragraph of page three of the nine-page DIKO-AKEL "minimum program"--the paragraph in which Kyprianou appeared to forget

the "unity" agreed upon with the Greek premier to solve and not to perpetuate the Cyprus question. On this point the Cypriot and the Greek people share the same vision--a solution guaranteed by international bodies and not an entrapment in the "Turkish haggling" which for 8 years now has achieved absolutely nothing except to increase the distance from that vision.

That the Athens reaction was correct is proved by the fact that Kyprianou--one of the DIKO-AKEL agreement signers--hastened to issue a statement yesterday to the Athens News Agency, unilaterally changing the "joint program" by reverting to the principle of internationalization and by moderating his position concerning the intercommunal dialogue. More important still is the assurance Kyprianou gave that no change whatever in policy will be made without an Athens-Nicosia understanding. It could not be otherwise since we talk about "unity" and not about the hypocritical principle that "Nicosia decides and Athens conforms."

Athens, the Greek people in other words, has the first word on the Cyprus question as long as it is asked to carry the burden of the struggle. It is not an observer nor a camp follower submitting to electoral expediencies. Athens supports the national cause.

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CSO: 4621/339

## HAIG, CEAUSESCU VISITS CONTRASTED

Athens ELEVTHERTYPIA in Greek 5 May 82 p 4

[Editorial]

[Text] The paths of representatives from two different worlds will cross this month in Athens. Today--yesterday--Romanian President Nikolai Ceausescu, a persistent fighter for the independence and non-alignment of his country. Tomorrow--15 May--the American Secretary of State Alexander Haig, an equally persistent fighter for the subjugation of all other countries to the commands of his country. What do the two visitors want from us?

Nicolai Ceausescu is seeking our friendship and support in a front of national independence and confrontation of the Great Powers on a basis of equality. He is also asking for our active participation in the idea of the Balkans without nuclear missiles, an idea whose realization will open the way for the much desired international disarmament which everyone discusses but no one does anything about. Both requests of the Romanian side are a declared and implemented policy of the Greek government. Ceausescu is simply breaking open doors because he already has what he is seeking.

Alexander Haig is coming to ask from us the continuation of a foreign policy for which our country has paid dearly until now: our blind participation in NATO in order to be saved ostensibly from the traditional "danger from the north" at a time when the "danger from the east" is so evident as to bring us repeatedly to the brink of war with our "ally" Turkey; the maintenance on our soil of the American bases which are Washington's eye for spying on neighboring Arab countries; the demonstration of a more relaxed policy toward the Cypriot question so that the Turkish junta, the favored of the free world, will not undergo pressures and worries.

The Greek socialist government is asked now to make its choice using of course all the tact and precaution the occasion demands.

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CSO: 4621/339

## DISADVANTAGES OF 'EXTREME' PRO-ARAB STANCE ANALYZED

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 30 Apr 82 p 11

Text A pro-Arab policy is traditional in our country. All postwar governments steadfastly implemented it. The Papandreou government, however, pushed it to the extremes and transferred it from the level of interstate relations to that of a common...ideology(?) and partisan...position with the..."Arab nation" which of course does not exist. It does not exist because the Arabs are a "world" with many states, with a variety of ideologies and various regimes, serious religious and other differences and contrasts which often lead to an open clash. The result is that we appear on the international scene as more "Arab than the Arabs." Do we at least gain something?

1. Losses

The excuse for this immeasurably pro-Arab policy was the anticipation of "oceans of investments" and "colossal loans" which would "support the drachma" and would... "restructure" our country. But the results have been exactly the opposite:

a. We did not receive from the Arabs even 1 dollar in the form of investment or loan.

b. We displeased the entire West and especially the United States. Of course, without reason or gain we arrived at a "cold war" situation with Israel which, as is known, exerts considerable influence on all the Western world. Especially effective is its influence on loan granting organizations from which we expect a lot and also on the media of international prestige on whose attitude depend many things which affect our national interests.

c. We displeased the "rightists" and pro-Western Arabs who are enemies of the "leftist" and "anti-Western" Arabs toward whom PASOK extends its friendship. These displeased Arabs are the most important Egypt politically and financially (Saudi Arabia, Emirates). They are displeased because the Papandreou policy did not even identify with the Arabs in general but only with the "extremists"-- Qadhafi, Syria, Arafat, who are also quarreling among themselves (Syria-Arafat). Papandreou succeeded in displeasing even...Khomeini by siding with Iraq.

d. This policy has been one of the reasons (the others are: anti-Americanism, anti-NATOism, pro-Jaruzelskiism) the Greek lobby in the United States collapsed

with serious negative repercussions in the whole progress of our national affairs (upsetting the 7 to 10 ratio /in military assistance/, for example).

## 2. Pro-Turks

What is the reward for the above losses? Nothing! Because even in the case of the Cyprus problem the Arabs in general continue to support Turkey which continually develops its relations with the Arabs! Its exports to them have risen from 10 percent a few years ago to 40 percent of its total exports. Libya assigned to it projects worth 9 billion dollars. Iran supplied it with oil at prices lower than those of OPEK in exchange for Turkish products. The Pan-Islamic Congresses are steadily siding with Turkey. The Islamic Development Bank (main stockholder is Saudi Arabia) grants loans to Ankara whose relations with Syria, Libya and Iraq are improving steadily. Egypt, the only Arab country which supported us, is now changing its line /toward Greece/. The Islamic Institute of Economic Studies (the Arab capital, that is) has its headquarters in occupied Cyprus. Only a few days ago the World Islamic Union raised its voice in support of "130,000 Moslem Cypriots who...are being oppressed by the Kyprianou government!"

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CSO: 4621/339

## COMMENTARY ON POLISH 'SOLIDARITY' OCTOBER 1981 PROGRAM

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 9 Apr 82 p 3

[Article by Francesco Galgano: "Another Look at the Platform Solidarity Presented at Gdansk in October Last Year. Today It Is Even More Current. The Eastern Countries: Are the Closed Societies Really Creating Stability?"]

[Text] Only recently have we gained access to the full text in Italian of the platform which Solidarity presented at Gdansk in October of last year. That was 2 months before the proclamation of martial law and the interruption of the troubled career of free trade unions in Poland. Many things about this document are impressive. It brings forth new bits of evidence to make Polish developments more understandable and, further than that, permits discussion of Soviet bloc countries within the same context.

The first and most far-reaching revelation is that this last formal action of the independent Polish trade union is, with its more than 40 theses, actually a constitutional program which takes into account every aspect of society and proposes guidelines for a new constitution. This is merely the documentary, structural, and dated confirmation of what daily experience has already shown: namely, that Solidarity, born as an independent trade union, had little by little become a political party, albeit still an anomalous party. It had become a party because of the universality of its objectives and its represented interests, but not because of the instruments of action at its disposal which remained those of a trade union; that is, the right to strike and to bargain.

A second revelation, realized at the same time, is that this constitutional program, although it never uses the word "socialism," is articulated entirely within the ideal horizon of socialism completely expanded to envision the picture of a possible socialism different from the present socialism. Its slogan is "self-government." Its chief argument is that, through self-management, "the workmen can become the true owners of the enterprises." (The wording and role assigned the managers recall the Yugoslav experience.)

On the foreign policy level there at least seem to be signs of a break [with the government]. Membership in the Soviet bloc is not called into question, [however], (and at this point the analogy with the Yugoslav situation ends). From the outset, [the Gdansk platform] explicitly declares fidelity to the

international alliances of Poland and the intention not to endanger present international balances of power. It even adds that a "self-governed Poland" will be able to express a more convinced and therefore a more effective loyalty to these alliances.

The real sign of a break appears at another place: it occurs when terms of the agreement signed by Solidarity are infringed upon and the uniformity which characterizes not only the countries of the Soviet Bloc but all "true Socialist" countries (Yugoslavia included) is destroyed. In the agreements of August 1980, Solidarity had accepted two restraints. The first, which seems still to be respected in the October 1981 document, was acceptance of a system based on social ownership of the means of production and a return to socialist construction. Although presented as a comprehensive alternative to the present system of running the economy, the self-government proposal did not contradict the fundamental postulates of the written Constitution of Poland.

On the contrary, the evolution of the Polish Constitution, from 1952 to 1976, had already shown a considerable transformation. The Constitution of 1952 had designated "state industry" as the decisive factor in the socialist transformation of society as well as the principal instrument for assuring the right to work for Polish citizens. Then in the constitution of 1976 all emphasis on state industry disappears and, by contrast, catch phrases like self-government of enterprises and like the contribution of subordinates to the management of state enterprises make a sudden appearance. The Polish constitutional formula is, moreover, "social ownership" of the means of production. This corresponds to the Yugoslav formula and is antithetical to the formula, dominant in the East, according to which "state ownership" is elevated to "the principal form of socialist ownership."

But another restraint imposed by the agreements of August 1980 was acknowledgement of the role of the Polish United Workers' Party [PZPR] as the ruling party in Polish society. This restraint was also imposed by the Polish constitution of 1976 which actually opens with recognition of the leading role of the PZPR and with acceptance of the two other parties, the United Peasant Party [ZSL] and the Democratic Party [SD], only in affiliation with the PZPR within the National Front. Well now, this restraint is denounced in the Solidarity platform of October 1981. For one thing, merely the existence of a vanguard party is identified as the cause of the ills afflicting Poland. For another thing, the theses develop a proposal for a political system based on political freedom: freedom to establish political parties and freedom for each party to present its list of candidates at elections.

This denunciation of the vanguard party and this call for political freedom brought into full focus the knotty problem which had existed in Poland ever since the August agreements. (I am not, as I have already written "heatedly" in this column, among those who think Solidarity "went too far.") The recognition of the freedom of trade unions cannot co-exist with the denial of political freedom. Otherwise the overburden of tasks falling to the union and the exasperating contentiousness generated in a society in which the

right to strike is the only instrument for taking up arms no matter what the social grievance--these conditions open up a lacerating contradiction and plunge a country into a situation where it absolutely cannot be governed. In the October document a similar analysis was implicit. It held that only a dialogue among parties or equal standing would have been able to absorb, refine, and coordinate the continually more insistent thrust of Polish society.

In a way then it was a question of returning to the 1952 constitution which defined Poland as a socialist republic and directed all energies of the country toward socialist construction (although at that time in the form of State socialism), but which ignored completely the principle of the vanguard party and, at least on paper, recognized Polish freedom with the sole proviso that every "political association" respect the objectives of socialist construction specified in the Constitution. But rather than untying the knot, [the government] preferred to cut it. What would untying it have meant? In the general sense of the Gdansk document, it would have meant that the PZPR would have had to set aside the dogma of "cohesiveness" of the political system which in the political philosophy of the Eastern countries excludes "rivalry" among political parties, renounce the privilege of vanguard party, and compete dialectically with other political parties. The latter would not have been protagonists of an antisocialist vision for Polish society (favoring restoration of capitalism), but rather of a different vision for socialist construction in Poland. The stakes in the game would have been the "how" and not the "whether" in regard to socialism, not only concerning international alliances but also concerning basic options in the political and social systems.

There remains, among many, one question which reaches across the boundaries of Poland and invades the very ground of international balances of power which the Polish case has so sharply put to the test. This dogma of "cohesiveness" of the political system, in the name of which the principle of the vanguard party is termed irreconcilable in each of the Eastern countries, is in a sense a heritage of the primitive way to socialism regarding which we in the West have developed a definite critical opinion. But in another sense, it is, contrariwise and overridingly, the reflex of a permanent condition of "defensive emergency" in which the Soviet Bloc lives.

That is the question: is this "cohesiveness" really a guarantee of stability within the Soviet Bloc and therefore a factor in the world balance of power? Or rather is the opposite true? The Polish case and the regression which followed it on the difficult road toward relaxation of international tensions show how imposition of this "cohesiveness" on the individual societies of the East is a factor which generates instability and endangers, rather than safeguards, the world balance of power. The Warsaw agreements of August 1980 had just revealed how the Eastern systems contained considerable margins of previously unsuspected elasticity. The Gdansk document, although breaking one point of that agreement, still was maneuvering within reasonable margins of tolerance. It did not hurt, but rather helped, the cause of socialism; it did not hurt, but rather helped, the cause of world security.

9972

CSO: 3104/183

## BRIEFS

BERLINGUER MEETS BELGIAN CP LEADER--Rome--Belgian Communist Party [CPB] Chairman Comrade Loius Van Geyt has met in Rome with PCI Secretary General Comrade Enrico Berlinguer. The conversation was attended by the following comrades: Pierre Beauvois, CPB Politburo member and editor of DRAPEAU ROUGE; Susa Nudelhole, member of the CPB Secretariat and chief of the foreign section; Gian Carlo Pajetta, of the PCI Directorate; and Rodolfo Mechini, deputy chief of the PCI foreign section. The conversation provided an opportunity for a broad exchange of viewpoints on the international situation, on the political, economic and social situation in Belgium and Italy and on the two parties' activities. Louis Van Geyt gave a briefing on the recent 24th PCB Congress. During the discussion particular attention was devoted to people's demonstrations--in Europe and particularly in the two countries--for disarmament and peace and to the unitary development of this broad movement. The two delegations agreed on the need to further develop the existing friendly relations between the parties. [Text] [PM271419 Rome L'UNITA in Italian 22 May 82 p 13]

BERLINGUER GREETES HUNGARY'S KADAR--Rome--[PCI Secretary General] Enrico Berlinguer has sent Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party First Secretary Janos Kadar the following message: "Dear Comrade Kadar, I send you the warm and friendly wishes of the PCI Central Committee and myself on your 70th birthday. It gives me pleasure to seize this opportunity to reaffirm our respect and friendship and to stress the sustained and perspicacious commitment which you have shown in your communist militancy in the antifascist struggle for national independence and to promote the building of a socialist society in Hungary. We wish you good health dear Comrade Kadar and further success in your valued work for the Hungarian people's progress and for a peaceful world. [Text] [PM020823 Venice L'UNITA in Italian 27 May 82 p 19]

CSO: 3104/211

## 'MILLIYET' OUTLINES PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL ELEMENTS

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 13-15 Apr 82

[Article by Orhan Tokatli, discussing constitutional treatment of presidential powers, the legislature, former politicians and right to strike]

[13 Apr 82 p 9]

[Text] Ankara--Drafting of the new constitution has been stepped up so as to allow a referendum in the fall. The new constitution will take final form by passing through five stages.

These stages are:

1. Consultative Assembly Constitutional Commission
2. Consultative Assembly General Session
3. National Security Council Select Committee
4. National Security Council
5. Public referendum

At the penultimate stage in this program, the National Security Council [NSC] will imprint its political preference on the constitution, giving the ultimate form to the draft constitution to be submitted to the public. In this series of articles, we will attempt to set forth the basic principles of the draft constitution and the elements under consideration for it, bearing in mind all the stages and in such a way as to reflect the views of the competent circles.

As the "institution of the presidency", the powers of this institution and the election of the president comprise one of the most important topics, we shall start here.

As known, there was no president at the helm on 12 September 1980, the day the Turkish Armed Forces seized the administration by decree and within the chain of command. Months of rounds in parliament had produced no result. The office of the presidency was being administered "by proxy." One reason for the Turkish Armed Forces' takeover on 12 September was the months-long stalemate in the presidential election. After 12 September, the National Security Council was formed and Chief of Staff General Kenan Evren took on the task of

"Head of State." As would be seen, after quibbling on this point, the term "head of state" was deemed appropriate. This is why, for a time, there was debate over whether the term "head of state" would continue to be used after restoration of a sound and functioning democracy. The matter has clarified lately and it looks as though the term "president of the republic" will be used in the new constitution. Moreover, it has been deemed appropriate that the office of the presidency be treated in the new constitution in such a way as to reflect the will of the nation.

Meanwhile, parliamentary election of the president has also gained prominence. Views advocating popular election of the president found no support and it was determined that parliamentary election better suits the structure of Turkish society. It was pointed out that if the president were popularly elected, this highest of offices would be drawn into political controversy and this would be detrimental to the office. These examples were given:

"When former prime minister [as published] Rauf Orbay, the Hamidiye hero, and Cemal Madanoglu, an important commander of 27 May, ran as independents for national deputy in Istanbul, they got only modest votes."

#### How the President Will Be Elected

The question arises of how this election will be conducted. A number of options are being offered.

First of all, those who recall the presidential ballots in the TGNA [Turkish Grand National Assembly] prior to 12 September want firm, clear and comprehensible provisions placed in the new constitution to prevent that kind of deprecation of this high office. Those who contend that the president, as the ultimate guardian of the state's interests and integrity, must be impartial as long as he is in office feel that anyone running for this office must sever relations with the political parties prior to announcing his candidacy and have nothing to do with the parties. It is hoped in this context that anyone running for the presidency who severs relations with the parties but fails to win the election would be prevented from returning to his party for a term or two. This would short-circuit the risk of people declaring their candidacy for president on impulse as happened prior to 12 September. Election of the president for a 7-year term, as it has been all along, is also heavily favored. It is hoped, however, that the constitution will contain provisions to prevent outgoing presidents from returning to their parties for a session or two.

#### Election Ballots

A provision found in the Greek constitution will be employed to prevent prolonged presidential ballots. This calls for parliament to dissolve itself and hold elections if it does not elect a president on the third ballot.

#### Presidential Powers

The new constitution will expand the powers of the president. One of the most important presidential powers under consideration is the power to dissolve parliament and call elections. This power will be limited, however, thusly: The president may call elections if governments cannot be formed within a specific and reasonable period of time (perhaps from 40 to 60 or 90 days).

## Veto and Referendum

Retention by this constitution, as in the 1961 Constitution, of the presidential power of veto over laws passed by the parliament is under consideration. However, instituting a referendum as a supplement to this is envisaged. Although it has not yet been fully worked out, if disagreement occurs between the parliament and a president who exercises the veto over a law and if the parliament insists steadfastly on the law, the president may submit the controversy to referendum.

## Other Powers

Meanwhile, powers which have been granted to the head of state by certain laws passed since 12 September will be included in the new constitution. To refresh our readers' memories, we list these powers again here:

1. The Prosecutor General of the Republic and the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Republic will be chosen by the president from among candidates selected by the Supreme Court of Appeals' Grand General Council from among its own members.
2. Eight members of the Higher Education Council will be chosen directly by the president in accordance with the Higher Education Council Law. The president's approval of the other members will also be necessary. University rectors will be selected by the president from among four candidates proposed by the Higher Education Council.
3. For seats on the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, the President will select two primary members and two alternates for each from among candidates proposed by the general councils of the Supreme Court of Appeals and the Council of State.
4. The president will select the members of the State Oversight Council.
5. The president will exercise his powers also in the selection of Council of State members.

## Constitutional Court

Selection by the president is envisaged in this connection with one-third of the members of the Constitutional Court. The high judicial organs will present candidates for the other seats and the president will choose from among them. As for the method of having the houses of parliament elect members of the Constitutional Court, elimination of this is under consideration on the rationale that it did not work.

--The Constitutional Court will not be able to overturn laws passed by the legislative organ. Laws may be repealed on the basis of form. That is, if a law is adopted without a majority in parliamentary deliberations, a repeal ruling may be applied.

--A plurality will be sought in Constitutional Court rulings. In this way adoption of rulings with a one-vote margin will be prevented.

--Matters ruled on by the Constitutional Court will not be reconsidered by the court within 5 or 10 years. Once a ruling is made, it will have the force of a final judgement, remaining in effect for a long period of time (the Constitutional Court suggested a period of 2 years in the presentation of its views on the constitution).

--Certain changes will also be made as regards the bodies which may petition the Constitutional Court for repeal.

[14 Apr 82 p 9]

[Text] As preparations for the new constitution proceed, views are beginning to take shape on what form the legislature will take, what method of elections will be used what the functions of the Board of National Security Advisors will be and what will constitute a state of emergency.

Some of the ideas entertained on these topics are listed as options. The Consultative Assembly will have first choice, followed by the National Security Council.

#### Legislature

Although proposals have gained prominence that the Senate of the Republic as established by the 1961 Constitution has been unable for various reasons in the past to perform the functions expected of it and the legislative organ should be a unicameral body, the new constitution will reportedly retain the bicameral legislature.

As known, the two houses of parliament in Turkey have a long history. During the Constitutional Sultantate Period, there was alongside the House of Deputies a House of Notables, which may be acceptably termed a senate. The House of Notables was abolished in the Republican Period. The bicameral parliament debate was revived by the opposition in the years from 1950 to 1960. At that time, the single house of parliament was passing laws very quickly, leading to criticisms that they were not sufficiently examined, and a second house was envisaged to remedy this. The constitution drawn up after 27 May 1960 brought the second house into being, naming it the Republican Senate. Thus it was ensured that the members of the National Unity Committee took their places in the legislature. The presidential quota senators included in this body provided a source for the presidential elections.

However, the Republican Senate's existence and modus operandi were frequent topics of debate in the recent past. This time it was suggested that the Republican Senate was a delaying factor in legislative endeavors. Discussion of the budget first by the Senate, then by the Assembly of Deputies was considered excessive, and the "shuttling" of laws between the two houses delayed results on controversial issues.

The new constitution is expected to contain measures to remedy the objections observed in the previous period.

## Assembly

The National Assembly part of the legislature will continue to perform the basic functions as before. The Assembly is envisaged as being composed of 400-450 national deputies. National Deputies will continue to be elected to 4-year terms and governments will seek votes of confidence in this assembly.

## Republican Divan or Republic Council

For the second house of the legislature, the term "senate" will not be used, but another name will be conferred upon it. Names such as "Republican Divan" or "Republican Council" have been proposed. The Divan or Council will be composed of 100 or 150 members. Various options are envisaged for the composition of this body. These options may be listed as follows:

1. One-third of the members would be presidential appointments as quota members.
2. In addition to the presidential quota, former presidents, former speakers of the assembly of deputies, former chiefs of the general staff and judiciary organs would become life members, or the president would appoint his quota members from among them.
3. The remaining members would consist of one representative elected from each province, or the quota and life members would select provincial representatives.
4. Elected representatives would sever their relations with their parties for a given period of time.

Also under discussion is defining the basic function of the Republican "Divan" or Council as one of oversight, with oversight methods such as interpellation and general hearings being carried out here. In this way the oversight mechanism which did not work very well in the previous period would become more effective.

## Electoral Method

The clear trend for election to the National Assembly of Deputies is toward employing the system used in West Germany. The West German electoral system is a little complex but prevents small parties from taking seats in the assembly.

Half the members of the West German assembly (496 representatives) are elected by the majority system as the result of individual campaigns by the candidates. The other half, those who run and win on the straight party tickets, are determined by the proportional representation system (the d'Hondt system). The voters use two ballots. On the first, they vote for the candidate of their choice; on the second, they vote for the party of their choice. There is a 5-percent barrier for election for the second half. Parties failing to pass the barrier lose their chances of representation in the assembly.

## Board of National Security Advisors

The Board of National Security Advisors will reportedly remain in the new constitution as it is in the 1961 Constitution. The membership of this board, however, will be clearly delineated and its powers will be increased.

## State of Emergency

A three-stage process is envisaged in the new constitution to be applied when the nation is in crisis and social disturbances reach an advanced state. These will be listed by degrees as state of emergency, martial law and state of war.

As known, the 1961 Constitution provided for a state of emergency, but it was acceptable only to natural disasters. This time the state of emergency will be defined in the constitution so as to be applicable to anarchy and terrorism and to civil disturbances. This will eliminate the need to declare martial law every time.

A state of emergency will be declared by the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the Board of National Security Advisors and will go to the assembly for approval within 24 hours. The administrative authorities will have full powers in areas declared under a state of emergency. The police will also be equipped with emergency powers. State security courts (their names may be changed) will be set up immediately in these areas and they will be fully empowered. Strikes, lockouts, rallies and demonstrations will not be allowed in areas declared under a state of emergency and associations and organizations will be banned. A "stay of execution" will not be allowed concerning administrative procedures carried out in these areas.

[15 Apr 82 p 8]

[Text] The status of former political party leaders will be settled by the new constitution. It looks as though their exclusion from elections is final for the present. However, it has not yet been determined whether the period of the leaders' exclusion from elections will be for one session or two.

Thought is also being given to deciding whether top party administrators other than the leaders may participate in the elections on the basis of their attitude when the constitution is submitted to referendum. Depending on the situation, the number not allowed to participate in the elections may be reduced or expanded.

## Language Problem

The part of the 1961 Constitution from the preamble to the legislation section, that is, most of the articles dealing with individual rights, will be adopted verbatim because they comprise the principles of the declaration of human rights.

However, the provision in article 3, paragraph 2, among the general principles which states, "The official language is Turkish," will be clarified. A provision may be added here in the new constitution to the effect that a

council shall be formed "to decide the language to be used on TV-radio and in the schools and official offices" in order to prevent alienation between generations and to ensure integrity of the language. This council may compile a dictionary if necessary.

#### Bureaucracy

Provisions concerning civil servants will also be placed in the new constitution. First of all, civil servants will be prevented from forming unions and associations.

However, the formation of a council is envisaged in order to:

1. Protect the dignity of the state employee in the state bureaucracy,
2. Free civil servants from political interference,
3. Best utilize civil servants in the state service,
4. Prevent civil servants' dismissal from their posts with each changing administration.

Also under consideration is a council for civil servants like the Supreme Military Council which handles appointments, transfers and promotions in the Turkish Armed Forces. This is not yet definite, however.

#### Extremist Trends

Meanwhile, the new constitution will preserve the social and economic rights and duties in the sense and spirit of the Ataturkist reforms and, as Head of State Kenan Evren said in his Bursa speech, will not be vulnerable to the extreme right, the extreme left or regression.

#### Decree Having the Force of Law

The power to issue decrees having the force of law will also be included in the new constitution. A decision just recently adopted by the National Security Council in this regard will go into the new constitution.

As known, according to NSC Resolution No 64, the law granting the power to issue decrees having the force of law requires that the purpose of the decree to be issued and the period during which this authority will be exercised be stated. Decrees having the force of law cannot impose financial burdens or increase existing liabilities. On the other hand, penalties provided by law for acts in violation of the tax laws, taxes, duties and related fines and late-payment fees may be reduced or eliminated.

#### Expropriation

Article 38 of the old constitution, the one dealing with expropriation, will be revised in the new constitution, putting it on a "market price" basis. The NSC has already defined "taxation value" in its amendment of the Tax Procedure Law as "the market price of buildings and land." And market price is described as "the normal buying and selling value on the day an economic transaction takes place."

## Compulsory Arbitration in Certain Strikes

Meanwhile, the new constitution will contain a provision requiring "compulsory arbitration" instead of a strike in certain branches of labor. Strikes are banned, under existing law, during states of general or partial mobilization, in workplaces which manufacture drugs and vaccines, in jobs involving the preservation of life and property, in water, electricity and natural gas plants, in operating means of transportation by air, land and sea, in the notary services, in the institutions of education and learning and in child care facilities. Sanitation jobs, coal production facilities, petroleum, hotels during tourist season and banks will probably be added to these bans. Instead of strikes in these places, the new constitution will require the resolution of collective bargaining by submission to arbitration. The Supreme Arbitration Council performs this kind of duty at present.

## New Constitution Preamble

The preamble to the new constitution will be written according to the 12 September philosophy. Some of the reform laws will be placed in the constitution.

Moreover, effort will be exerted in order that the new constitution not be a reactionary constitution, making full use of the experience gained during the prior multiparty period.

8349

CSO: 4654/293/297

## COMMISSION REPORTS ON BUNDESWEHR MANPOWER NEEDS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 11 May 82 pp 1, 2

[Report by the Long-Range Planning Commission: "The Bundeswehr Needs More Money, More Volunteers, Longer Compulsory Service. Can the Deterrent and Defense Mandates Continue To Be Met?"]

[Text] Lengthening compulsory military service from the current 15 months to 18 months in this decade and to 2 years in the following decade, substantial additional outlays for defense, recruitment of more volunteers, including up to 30,000 women, indeed even drawing on the 20,000 young foreigners who live in the FRG: according to the findings of a long-range planning commission, which was appointed by Minister of Defense Apel, all this is essential in order to maintain the Bundeswehr at its current level of 495,000 men. If these efforts were to remain undone, then the Bundeswehr would shrink in the next decade to almost half its present size, for, as a consequence of the "pill fad," from 1987 on there will no longer be enough people available who are subject to military duty. Without additional measures by 1995 the Bundeswehr will shrink from the current 495,000 to 290,000 men, thus, it will become smaller by four-tenths or almost one-half. In this case it would not only be completely unable to meet its deterrent and defense mandates, it would also reduce the NATO allies' preparedness to do their part in the forward defense of the FRG.

These are the most important findings of the long-range planning commission which at the request of Minister of Defense Apel was to seek possibilities as to how the Bundeswehr, within the framework of NATO, can meet its mandate in the 1980's, but mainly how the personnel and material readiness for use, which is essential for this purpose can be guaranteed. The commission, which will adopt its report on Thursday at a final meeting and then intends to pass it on to Apel, is under the direction of State Secretary Leister who is responsible for the arms and military policy sector. In addition to several outside experts, among them government spokesman Ruehl, its members include the general inspector and his deputy, the inspectors of the branches of the armed forces and several department heads in the Ministry.

In order to bring about in a timely manner the lengthening of basic military service to 18 months, which is deemed "indispensable," the commission considers it mandatory to introduce legislative measures in 1984. It is stated in the

recommendations of the report that the decision about an extension beyond that is due at the end of the decade. "Flanking measures"--this is how enhancing the professional and financial attractiveness is circumscribed--are to be introduced yet this year. In addition to the lengthening of compulsory military service, the second central measure of guaranteeing the size of the Bundeswehr is to be the gradual increase in the number of those who voluntarily serve for lengthy periods. The commission recommends increasing their number from the current 251,000 to 264,000 by 1988 and extending the average tour of these soldiers with extended service terms from 7.4 years now to 8.8 years. The additional money which is required for personnel costs is estimated at DM1.2 billion annually.

Otherwise the report is strikingly reserved in respect to concrete cost estimates. To be sure, the fact is frequently stressed that additional outlays will arise not only if the size of the armed forces is to be kept, but also if it should become smaller, for then development and procurement of new weapons and devices which require less personnel will be especially urgent. It states that in any event an "appropriate" increase in funds is essential.

An exact timetable is recommended for the measures which are to prevent shrinkage of the Bundeswehr:

--In 1982 the decision about the number of women to be recruited is to be made;

--In 1983 the decision about stricter new standards for "induction difficulties, and about the new criteria of fitness is to be considered;

--Likewise in the coming year additional money for research and development of new weapons which require less personnel is to be made available.

In the report of the long-range planning commission it is established that overall "consideration" must be given in the next budget negotiations to the fact that shortly--thus almost immediately--additional funds will be necessary in order to get a handle on the long-term difficulties of the Bundeswehr.

If the peacetime strength of the Bundeswehr should decrease, then according to the report, the FRG would have to adjust to far-reaching consequences. If the intention is to maintain the capability of the Bundeswehr to meet its mandates then it must not be reduced by any more than 15,000 men.

Reductions by roughly 10 percent of its current size--thus by 50,000 men--would make it necessary to "modify" the mandate. A 20-percent reduction to only 400,000 men means abandoning forward defense, thus the effort to defend the FRG as close to the border as possible. With a reduction to 400,000 men the Bundeswehr will become a training army. Its current structure as a present armed force will have to be given up and a different structure, which is "oriented toward young growth," will have to be sought. Fulfilling the job in terms of today's understanding would no longer be possible then, the deterrent value inadequate and the lowering of the nuclear threshold mandatory. "The loss of present forces could not...be balanced out." In this connection it is stated that "a restriction on the capability of the German armed forces for forward defense would have to involve similar developments among the allied forces."

Noteworthy also is what the report says about the foreseeable consequences of the shortage of money for arms. Because of the costs it will not be possible, as has been the case, to replace one generation of weapons by the next at 15-year intervals. Rather, it will be necessary to leave the obsolescent weapons in service longer. At the same time, attention is drawn to the fact that this has weighty consequences for the balance of power because the Eastern bloc continuously and intensively continues its arming. In addition to its numerical superiority there is now qualitative catching up. NATO possibly still shows its superiority in individual subsectors, but even this will no longer be the case in the 1990's. The technological situation is critical today in sectors like sensors, electronic and optical countermeasures, reconnaissance, camouflage, fire control, leadership and data transmission, NBC [nuclear-biological-chemical] defense, missile use and submarine warfare. The problem with one's own arms is accordingly due to the rising costs, the skimpy finances and the superior quantity and increasing quality of arms in the Warsaw Pact. In view of these facts there is no "ingenious solution" for our own arms. It is expressly noted that the equipment needed to fulfill "the Bundeswehr's own tasks" is now tactically obsolete. Of course, no mention is made of which sectors these are.

12124

CSO: 3103/467

MILITARY

GREECE

PAPANDREOU PRAISES NAVY'S WAR READINESS

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 28 Apr 82 p 1

[Text] Yesterday morning premier and minister of National Defense, Mr. Andreas Papandreou, accompanied by the deputy minister, Mr. Andonis Drosogiannis, and the chief of GEETHA [National Defense General Staff], Admiral Degiannis, inspected the facilities of the Fleet.

Mr. Papandreou visited by helicopter the Navy Helicopter Base and immediately afterwards, the Naval Technical Training School where he received a briefing on its operations.

He later inspected the missile fast attack craft base and was briefed on the boats' operational capabilities. The premier then reached the Salamina Naval Base by missile attack craft, where he inspected the naval units, visited the frigate "Elli," and the submarine base.

In summarizing his views during a speech for the officers, Mr. Papandreou emphasized his complete satisfaction for the capability, the thorough knowledge and readiness of the men of the Navy and made reference to the special configuration of our territory which requires the armed forces of the country to be in a position to repel at any moment any attempt and to protect the security of our nation.

The premier was emphatic in underlining that the government and the Greek people are determined to provide the Navy, the Air Force, and the Army with all the necessary support in order to enable them to perform the tasks assigned to them.

The premier, was met upon his arrival at the Naval Base by the Chief of GEN [Naval General Staff], Vice Admiral Pappas, and the Commandant of the Fleet, Vice Admiral Giongezas. In a speech following the premeier's arrival Admiral Pappas underlined the concurrence of the men of the Navy and their common determination to maintain the fleet on a high level of training, capability and preparedness.

Admiral Pappas added, "Under the international treaties and the special conditions which prevail in our sector of responsibility, the Navy, well equipped with up-to-date weapons systems, with excellent manpower with perfect training, steady determination and high morale is prepared to carry out your orders immediately."

9731

CSO: 4621/342

## AIR FORCE MANEUVERS PRAISED; LEOPARD TANKS PURCHASE DENIED

Athens TA NEA in Greek 26 Apr 82 pp 1, 11

[Text] Exercises of alertness and preparedness of the Armed Forces began day-before-yesterday, on Saturday, with aircraft precision demonstrations, and will continue tomorrow at the Salamina Naval Base where the premier and minister of National Defense, Mr. Andreas Papandreou, will proceed to inspect the vessels of the Fleet.

On this occasion the premier will observe large-scale training exercises of precision and readiness of the other élite units during which paratrooper units will take part. He will also visit military units in various areas of the country.

The great success of the exercises which the premier observed on Saturday on an island of the Aegean, already offer a safe conclusion that the Greek Armed Forces are indeed at a high degree of readiness and in a position to defend, at any moment, the sovereign rights of Greece as Mr. Papandreou emphasized after observing the maneuvers by the Air Force.

#### The Air Force Maneuvers

It is noted that the maneuvers observed by the premier on Saturday demonstrated that the aircraft of the Air Force responded completely and within a shorter time than that foreseen under emergency conditions.

The premier and minister of National Defense warmly congratulated all the participants in the maneuvers which were carried out to demonstrate the high degree of military competence and which were comprised of simulated bombings, precision evolutions and simulated aerial combat, etc.

The maneuvers lasted three hours under the command of Lieutenant General Khatziris of the 28th TAD [Tactical Air Force]. In addition to the premier, they were observed by deputy minister of Defense, Mr. A. Drosogiannis; the deputy minister to the Premier, M. D. Maroudas; the chief of the GEETHA [National Defense General Staff], Admiral Degiannis; the chief of the Air Force Lieutenant General Kouris; the director of the Diplomatic Office of the Premier, Mr. Kh. Makhairitsas; and the general director of Press and Information, Mr. S. Kostopoulos.

After the maneuvers the chief of the Air Force, General Kouris, hosted a dinner for the high ranking officers of the Air Force, pilots, technicians, airmen, etc. In

congratulating the Command of the Air Force and those who participated in the demonstration, the premier had the opportunity to assure the Air Force Command that the Greek people and the government will provide the Armed Forces with the necessary implements in order for them to be able, at all times, to successfully defend the sovereign rights and the borders of the nation.

Finally, the chief of the Air Force, in briefing the premier, assured him that the Air Force is in a position to protect at all times the territory of Greece and that the men of the Air Force are at their posts, day and night, ready to defend the country.

#### "Mirage" Purchase

In the meantime, as published in a LE MONDE report from Athens, conversations between experts have begun for the prospective purchase of "Mirage 2000" fighter aircraft.

The relative decision, on the part of Greece, is expected to be made next October as mentioned in the report which adds that Greece is, at the same time, negotiating the purchase of anti-aircraft defense systems with low-flying supersonic missiles of "Rosanne" or "Sidewinder" type.

On the other hand, a government spokesman yesterday denied a RIZOSPASTIS report which stated that Greece "is about to offer more than 25 billion drachmas to the West German monopoly State-Mafel for the purchase of 100 obsolete "Leopard" tanks.

The government spokesman emphasized that there are no Greek orders for the purchase of "Leopard"-type tanks nor that any negotiations on the subject have taken place.

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END